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Despite increased recognition of the importance of sound corporate governance practices in emerging markets, previous 
researchers reported inconclusive evidence on the association between corporate governance and financial performance. 
Authors that predominantly focused on board-related variables might, however, have failed to reflect the complex nature 
of corporate governance. The financial performance measures employed in the majority of previous studies also ignored 
the potential risk-reducing benefits that sound corporate governance could hold for emerging market firms. The purpose of 
this article was thus to investigate the relationship between a comprehensive measure of corporate governance and the risk-
adjusted performance of selected South African companies. A unique corporate governance database was compiled by 
conducting content analysis on the considered companies’ annual reports over the period 2002 to 2010. Aspects related to 
nine corporate governance categories were taken into account. In addition to the accounting and market-based performance 
measures that were employed in previous studies, South African companies’ risk-adjusted performance was also taken into 
account. The capital asset pricing model and the Fama-French three-factor model were employed to estimate risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns for four corporate governance-sorted portfolios. Both estimations revealed that the portfolio comprising 
of companies with the highest corporate governance scores managed to significantly outperform the market. 
 
Introduction 
 
The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (in Viviers, 
Bosch, Smit & Buijs, 2009) stated that “there are three steps 
in the revelation of any truth: Firstly, it is ridiculed; secondly, 
it is resisted and thirdly, it is considered self-evident”. This 
statement is particularly apt in light of the increasing number 
of responsible investors who actively integrate 
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) 
considerations into their investment analyses and ownership 
practices. 
 
Some investors base their investment decisions on the moral 
conviction that the effective deployment of capital can 
(partly) address their ESG concerns. In addition to a moral 
case for ESG compliance, other investors are considering the 
potential to align ESG considerations with financial returns. 
Such investors are interested in the financial materiality (also 
called the business case) of responsible investing (Investment 
Leaders Group, 2014). 
 
Many global and local investors regard ESG management to 
be narrowly concerned with corporate governance. They 
hence tend to place more focus on corporate governance than 
environmental and social considerations (Van der Ahee & 
Schulschenk, 2013). This tendency might partly be ascribed 
to the publication of several corporate governance guidelines 
since the 1990s. Furthermore, while some corporate 
governance aspects (e.g. board composition) are relatively 
easy to measure, environmental and social aspects might be 
more difficult to appraise. 
 
Corporate governance started to attract attention within an 
emerging market context in 1994 with the publication of the 
first King Report in South Africa. The country has a well-
developed corporate governance framework that provides 
compliance guidance to board members, managers and 
accountants of locally listed firms. The King 
recommendations are, however, criticised by some local role-
players for encouraging “tick-box” compliance practices 
(Heath, 2014). If a firm merely attempts to comply with the 
basic King recommendations, the benefits of effective 
corporate governance compliance might not be obtained. It is 
therefore essential to evaluate a firm’s overall corporate 
governance position, rather than focusing only on the most 
visible aspects. 
 
High compliance costs could also constrain firms from 
effectively implementing the King guidelines. Some 
investors might perceive corporate governance as an 
unnecessary expense that reduces their investee firms’ ability 
to pursue profitable opportunities (Du Plessis, Hargovan & 
Bagaric, 2011). These investors should, however, realise that 
the failure to implement corporate governance practices could 
expose them to risks that might result in lower investment 
returns over the long run. 
 
While South Africa offers abundant investment opportunities, 
various ESG-related challenges such as HIV/AIDS, water 
scarcity and a lack of board diversity should not be ignored 
(Department: National Treasury Republic of South Africa, 
2011). The existence of a positive association between 
corporate governance and risk-adjusted share returns might 
encourage more investors to invest in locally-listed 
companies with high corporate governance compliance. 
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Extensive research has been conducted on the association 
between corporate governance and financial performance. 
Conflicting results were reported, reflecting positive, 
negative or no relationship between the considered variables. 
A possible reason for these inconsistent results is that 
researchers, especially in the emerging market context, 
typically applied one-dimensional (board-related) variables 
as a proxy for corporate governance. Such measures may be 
insufficient to reflect this concept’s complex nature. Previous 
authors almost exclusively considered corporate governance 
disclosure and ignored the acceptability of firms’ compliance 
practices. Furthermore, the majority of studies employed 
relatively simplistic accounting-based and non-risk adjusted 
market-based measures which failed to reflect the risk-
reducing potential of sound corporate governance 
compliance. 
 
The primary objective of this article was thus to investigate 
the relationship between a comprehensive measure of 
corporate governance and the risk-adjusted performance of 
selected companies that were listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) over the period 2002-2010. This time 
frame encompasses a period of high economic growth, a 
global financial crisis and the subsequent local recession. By 
conducting this study in South Africa, it is possible to 
investigate both disclosure and acceptability dimensions of 
corporate governance, given the well-developed framework 
provided by the King Reports. This article is the first local 
study that examines the association between corporate 
governance and performance by employing a comprehensive 
corporate governance measure and risk-adjusted returns over 
an extended period of time. 
 
Given the absence of comprehensive and standardised 
corporate governance data for the considered time period, the 
study’s first secondary objective was to compile a unique 
corporate governance database based on the content analysis 
of the considered firms’ published annual reports. The second 
secondary objective was to assess the relationship between 
corporate governance and selected accounting and market-
based measures (which focus only on return and excludes 
risk) that were employed by previous researchers. The third 
secondary objective was to extend on previous studies by 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
and the risk-adjusted performance of the considered 
companies by employing both the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and the Fama-French three-factor model. 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: First, a 
discussion is provided on corporate governance as a criterion 
used by responsible investors. Thereafter, a summary of 
previous studies reporting on the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance are 
provided. The methodology is then described, followed by a 
discussion of the empirical findings. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations, based on the identified limitations, are 
offered. 
 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
The most widely used definition of corporate governance is 
the “system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
(Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992). Corporate governance can also be 
defined as the manner in which finance suppliers assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). The actions of managers and the 
implementation (or lack) of corporate governance 
mechanisms are likely to have an effect on a firm’s 
investment, financing, distribution and operating decisions. 
The accountability of a company’s managers to financial 
claimholders might be enhanced by having extensive 
corporate governance mechanisms in place. As a result, 
countries with efficient governance systems could also 
become preferred locations for companies to operate and 
invest in (Grandori, 2004). 
 
South Africa is characterised by a well-developed corporate 
governance framework since the early 1990s. The King 
Report was revised in 2002, 2009 and 2016 to account for 
local statutory changes and global developments. The King 
Reports provide guidelines to JSE-listed firms regarding, 
inter alia, the role and responsibilities of directors, executive 
emolument and sustainability aspects. 
 
In line with the “comply or explain” approach of the King II 
Report, the JSE Listing Requirements (JSE, 2005) oblige 
listed firms to disclose their compliance or explain non-
compliance with the voluntary King II recommendations in 
their annual reports. This approach could, unfortunately, have 
resulted in “tick-box” compliance. In contrast, the King III 
Report follows an “apply or explain” approach that 
acknowledges that it is not a question of whether to comply 
or not, but rather to consider how the principles can be 
practically applied (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 
(IoDSA), 2009). 
 
South Africa’s ESG-regulatory environment is rapidly 
evolving. In 2011, Regulation 28 of the Pensions Fund Act 
(No. 24 of 1956) was amended to promote the inclusion of 
ESG considerations in pension funds’ investment analysis 
and ownership practices. Furthermore, the Code for 
Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) was 
introduced in the same year to give guidance to institutional 
investors on how they should execute their investment 
analysis and ownership activities (IoDSA, 2011). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, responsible investors can 
base their investment decisions on a business case for 
corporate governance. A number of researchers considered 
this business case in emerging and developing markets and 
reported inconclusive evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance and various performance measures. 
Table 1 provides a summary of selected previous studies. 
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Table 1: Summary of corporate governance and financial performance studies 
 
Author(s) and year 
Country/ 
Countries 
Corporate 
governance 
measure(s) 
Performance 
measure(s) 
Findings 
Klapper & Love (2004) 14 emerging markets 
(including South 
Africa) 
CLSA corporate 
governance 
questionnaire 
Return on Equity 
(ROE); Tobin’s Q 
Better corporate governance was correlated with better 
operating performance and market valuation. 
Haniffa & Hudaib 
(2006) 
Malaysia Board-specific 
characteristics; 
shareholding 
Return on assets 
(ROA); Tobin’s Q 
Positive relationships were reported. 
Abdo & Fisher (2007) South Africa Self-composed 
governance index 
Total share return 
(TSR); market-to-book 
value; price/earnings 
Positive correlation between corporate governance and 
share returns. 
Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) 
Sample of listed firms 
from Ghana, Nigeria, 
Kenya and South 
Africa 
Board variables ROA; Tobin’s Q Mixed results were reported. 
Imam & Malik (2007) Bangladesh Ownership structure TSR; Tobin’s Q Positive relationships were noted. 
Kajola (2008) Nigeria Board characteristics ROE Positive relationships were noted between ROE, board 
size and CEO status respectively. 
Chi (2009) Taiwan Transparency and 
disclosure 
Tobin’s Q Performance is positively associated with disclosure 
quality. 
Ehikioya (2009) Nigeria Board characteristics ROA; ROE; price-
earnings; Tobin’s Q 
Negative associations were reported for performance, 
CEO duality and family members on board respectively. 
Morey, Gottesman, 
Baker & Godridge 
(2009) 
21 emerging countries 
(including South 
Africa) 
AllianceBernstein 
ratings 
Tobin’s Q; price-to-
book ratio 
Corporate governance improvements resulted in positive 
market valuations. 
Ramdani & Van 
Witteloostuijn (2010) 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea and 
Thailand 
Board independence; 
CEO/chair role duality 
ROA Relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance was different across the conditional 
quantiles of the performance distribution. 
Othman (2012) 11 emerging African 
markets (including 
South Africa) 
Board structure and 
process disclosure 
(BSPD) 
ROE; Tobin’s Q; 
market-to-book ratio 
Influence of BSPD on performance was more 
pronounced for financial than non-financial Anglophone 
African firms. 
Alhaji, Yusoff & 
Alkali (2012) 
Malaysia Board-specific 
characteristics 
Earnings per share 
(EPS) 
No significant relationship was noted. 
Fallatah & Dickins 
(2012) 
Saudi Arabia Board aspects and 
share ownership 
ROA; Tobin’s Q; 
market value of equity 
Corporate governance and ROA was unrelated; 
corporate governance and Tobin’s Q was positively 
related. 
Mollah, Al Farooque & 
Karim (2012) 
Botswana Board-related 
variables; ownership 
structure 
ROA; ROE; Tobin’s Q No significant relationships were reported. 
Ntim, Opong & 
Danbolt (2012) 
South Africa Disclosure based on 50 
King II provisions 
TSR, ROA and Tobin’s 
Q 
Good corporate governance disclosure practices were 
positively related to firm value. 
Hassan & Halbouni 
(2013) 
United Arab Emirates Voluntary disclosure; 
board aspects; audit 
type 
ROA; ROE; Tobin’s Q Voluntary disclosure, CEO duality and board size 
influenced accounting performance. 
Velnampy (2013) Sri Lanka Board and committee 
characteristics 
ROA; ROE Corporate governance did not affect profitability. 
Hörnmark (2015) 23 emerging markets 
(including South 
Africa); results were 
compared with USA 
MSCI ESG-portfolio; 
corporate governance 
score was mainly based 
on board-related 
aspects 
CAPM was used for 
Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa 
(BRICs) countries; 
Fama-French three-
factor model was 
applied for other 
countries 
Insignificant positive alpha was reported for the South 
African portfolio. 
Islam, Sathye & Hu 
(2015) 
Bangladesh Corporate governance 
compliance score 
(based on 99 corporate 
governance elements 
applicable to banks) 
ROA; cost-to-income 
ratio (efficiency impact 
on performance) 
No significant relationship was found between 
Bangladeshi banks’ corporate governance practices and 
financial performance. 
Pamburai, Chamisa, 
Abdulla & Smith 
(2015) 
South Africa Board-related variables Economic value added 
(EVA); ROA; Tobin’s 
Q 
Board size was negatively related to EVA. A positive 
relationship was reported between Tobin’s Q and the 
proportion of non-executive directors. A negative 
association was noted between the frequency of board 
meetings and ROA and Tobin’s Q respectively. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Perusal of Table 1 reveals that many researchers focused only 
on board-related aspects. This tendency is not surprising, 
given that the directorate is regarded as the focal point of 
corporate governance. Board-related variables are also easy 
to quantify. A lack of standardised corporate governance data 
could furthermore have limited the comprehensiveness of 
preceding studies. 
Previous researchers seemed to favour accounting-based 
ratios (such as ROA) or relatively unsophisticated market-
based measures (such as TSR) when examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance. Inconclusive evidence was reported on the 
nature of this association. As far as could be determined, no 
previous researchers employed a multi-factor model to 
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estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns for portfolios that 
were compiled based on a comprehensive analysis of JSE-
listed firms’ corporate governance compliance. 
 
In light of the inconclusive evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance and to 
investigate whether the benefits of corporate governance 
compliance is perhaps reflected on a risk-adjusted basis, the 
following null hypotheses were formulated: 
 
𝐻01: There is no relationship between corporate 
governance and the ROA, ROE, EPS and TSR of selected 
JSE-listed companies. 
 
𝐻02: There is no relationship between corporate 
governance and the risk-adjusted abnormal returns of 
selected JSE-listed companies. 
 
 
Figure 1: Contribution of the corporate governance 
categories to the total CGS (a) 
 
(a) The 9 categories comprised 39 recommendations. Details could not be provided due to a 
confidentiality agreement. 
Source: Researchers’ compilation 
 
Data collection 
 
Secondary data were collected for companies that were listed 
in six JSE industries. Firms that were listed in the consumer 
goods, consumer services, industrials, technology, 
telecommunications and health care industries over the period 
2002 to 2010 were considered. Table 2 provides a summary 
of the considered companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of the considered companies (% of total sample) 
 
Year Health care  Consumer goods Consumer services Technology Telecoms Industrials Total 
2002 3.1 20.4 27.2 14.1 1.0 34.0 191 
2003 3.1 20.3 27.6 14.1 0.5 34.4 192 
2004 2.4 19.3 27.1 12.7 1.2 37.3 166 
2005 1.9 20.5 25.5 13.7 1.2 37.3 161 
2006 2.7 17.8 28.8 11.6 2.1 37.0 146 
2007 2.8 19.9 25.5 12.8 2.1 36.9 141 
2008 2.7 16.7 23.3 10.7 2.7 44.0 150 
2009 3.3 16.6 23.2 10.6 2.6 43.7 151 
2010 4.3 16.3 23.4 9.2 2.8 44.0 141 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
To ensure enough data points for analysis purposes, the 
selected firms had to be listed for at least two years during the 
research period. In an attempt to limit survivorship bias, 
companies that delisted during the research period were also 
considered. Firms that were listed in the financials, basic 
materials and oil and gas industries were excluded due to the 
differing nature of their financial reporting and extensive 
regulation. No firms were listed in the utilities industry during 
the research period. 
 
Since standardised corporate governance data were not 
readily available for JSE-listed firms for the period under 
review, the researchers compiled a unique database. A 
comprehensive corporate governance score (CGS) was 
determined for each of the firms for every year that they were 
listed during the research period. A refined version of the 
Public Investment Corporation (PIC) Corporate Governance 
Rating Matrix was employed for this purpose. The Centre for 
Corporate Governance in Africa designed this matrix on 
behalf of the PIC, one of the largest investment managers on 
the African continent. The comprehensive CGS employed in 
this study was deemed superior to the predominantly one-
dimensional (board-related) measures used in the majority of 
previous studies (refer to Table 1). The refined instrument 
consisted of nine categories, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
The research period ranged from 2002 (the year that the King 
II Report became effective) to 2010. This report’s 
recommendations were thus applicable to JSE-listed firms for 
almost a decade. Although the King III Report came into 
effect on 1 March 2010, integrated reporting only became 
mandatory for all JSE-listed companies in 2011 (Global 
Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2012). Depending on a 
firm’s financial year end (before or after 1 March 2010), some 
JSE-listed companies hence only started to comply with the 
King III guidelines after their 2010 financial year end. Many 
firms with a financial year end after 1 March 2010 
furthermore aimed to comply with the King II guidelines for 
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the largest part of their 2010 financial year. For consistency 
sake, the recommendations of the King II Report were 
therefore applied for the entire period. The considered 
companies’ annual reports were sourced from INET BFA 
(currently known as IRESS). 
 
A list of key words was compiled for each category, based on 
the King II Report and applicable literature. These key words 
were used to conduct content analysis on the considered 
firms’ annual reports. The reported corporate governance 
aspects were coded based on two dimensions, namely 
disclosure and acceptability. The focus of the disclosure 
dimension was on whether information related to the category 
under consideration was indicated/not indicated in an annual 
report. If evidence of information on a specific category was 
found, it was coded 1. The acceptability criteria centred on 
whether the disclosed aspect was in line with selected King II 
recommendations. If the disclosed aspect was deemed 
acceptable, it was coded 1; otherwise it was coded 0. 
 
Annual CGSs were compiled for 230 companies (1 439 
observations). The maximum CGS of 74 encompassed a 
maximum score of 39 for disclosure and 35 for acceptability. 
Acceptability criteria were not set for four corporate 
governance aspects (gender and race diversity, executive 
director remuneration and shareholding), since clear 
guidelines could not be determined. Care was taken to ensure 
that the coding was applied in the same manner for all the 
companies. 
 
In line with previous researchers (refer to Table 1), the ROA, 
ROE and EPS accounting-based measures were employed. 
Proponents of these ratios argue that profitability ratios are 
less influenced by the speculative behaviour of investors than 
market-based measures (Joh, 2003). A possible drawback is 
that reported profit could be manipulated by managers, 
resulting in inaccurate accounting ratios. Proponents of 
market-based measures reason that these measures are less 
subject to managerial manipulation in well-regulated markets 
than accounting-based measures (Mulsow, 2011). The TSR 
measure (which does not reflect risk) was hence also 
employed. Dybvig and Warachka (2010) indicated that the 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm performance is 
confounded by endogeneity. Based on their critique, this ratio 
was not considered. 
 
In addition, risk-adjusted abnormal returns were also 
estimated. Although the single-factor CAPM is commonly 
used to estimate risk-adjusted returns for South African firms, 
this model is not necessarily adequate (Ward & Muller, 
2012). Fama and French (1992) indicated that returns are not 
only based on market risk, but also on the spread in returns 
between small and large firms and value and growth shares 
respectively. Both the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor 
models were therefore used to make provision for risk and to 
control for the possibility that managers with poor 
compliance could inflate the other selected performance 
measures by engaging in risky activities. The following 
equations were used: 
Annual return on assets (ROA) (a): (1) 
 
Profit before interest and tax − total profits of extraordinary nature − taxation
Total assets
 x 100  
 
Annual return on equity (ROE) (a) (2) 
 
Profit after tax
Ordinary share capital + distributable reserves + 
non-distributable reserves + preference share capital + 
non-controlling interest
   x 100 
Annual headline earnings per share (EPS) (a) (3) 
 
Profit or loss attributable to ordinary shareholders of the parent firm*
Weighted average number of ordinary shares issued
 
 
*Separately identifiable re-measurements (net of related tax and 
non-controlling interest) were excluded. 
 
Monthly total share return (TSR) (a): (4) 
 
100 x [(
Share price at month end +  (∑
Final dividend per share at time 𝑡
12  x  share price at time 𝑡)
𝑛−1 
𝑡=0
Share price at the beginning of the month
) − 1] 
 
The following data were required for risk-adjusted 
estimation purposes: 
 
Book value of ordinary shares (year t-1) (a): (5) 
 
Ordinary share capital + non-distributable reserves + distributable reserves 
 
Size (year t-1) (a):   (6) 
 
Market capitalisation: 
market price per share x number of ordinary shares issued 
 
Return on the market (b): FTSE/JSE All Share Index (c) 
 
Monthly risk-free rate (b): Exchange yield on the long-term 
R186 government bond (d) 
 
(a) Data provided by INET BFA 
(b) Data provided by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER, 2013) 
(c) Previously employed by South African researchers (Ward & Muller, 2012; Van Rensburg 
& Robertson, 2003)  
(d) Previously employed by South African researchers (Mlonzi, Kruger & Nthoesane, 2011) 
 
The application of the estimation models entailed nine steps, 
as indicated in Table 3. Steps 1, 2 and 9 are applicable to both 
the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model, whereas 
steps 3-8 are only applicable to the latter model. 
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Table 3: Application of the CAPM and FAMA-French three-factor model 
 
Step 1 The monthly risk-adjusted share returns (return on the ith share less the risk-free rate) were determined for each of the sample 
firms. 
Step 2 The monthly market risk premiums were calculated. 
Step 3 The small minus big (SMB) size aspect was determined by sorting the firms from large to small, based on their market 
capitalisation. In line with Fama and French (1992), firms with the lowest 25% of market capitalisation were defined as small; the 
top 25% of firms were defined as big. 
Step 4 The monthly TSR was determined for each company in the small and big portfolios before calculating the average TSR for the 
big and small portfolios on a monthly basis. 
Step 5 The average monthly TSR for the big firms was subtracted from the average monthly TSR for the small firms for each of the 108 
months. The monthly differences were the SMB factor. 
Step 6 The sample firms’ book equity/market equity (BE/ME) ratios were calculated. To determine the high minus low (HML) aspect, 
the firms were sorted based on these ratios from high to low. In line with Fama and French (1995), the 30% of firms with the 
highest BE/ME ratio were included in the value portfolio (high), while the bottom 30% was defined as the growth portfolio (low). 
Step 7 The monthly TSR was calculated for each of the firms in the high and low portfolios. The average TSR was then calculated on a 
monthly basis for the high and low portfolios respectively. 
Step 8 The average TSR of the low portfolio was subtracted from the average TSR for the high portfolio for each of the considered 
months. These monthly differences were the HML factor. 
Step 9 The CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model were used to estimate alpha and betas.  
 
Source: Researchers’ compilation based on French (2013) and Fama and French (1995) 
 
In this study, attention was given to whether the portfolio 
consisting of firms with the highest CGSs reported a positive 
alpha. For this purpose, corporate governance (CG) portfolios 
were constructed as follows: The entire dataset was 
considered on a monthly basis. All firms that had a CGS were 
considered for inclusion in the monthly portfolio (the annual 
CGS was used for the relevant 12 months). The firms were 
then ranked according to their CGSs and the 25th and 75th 
percentiles were calculated. All firms with a CGS within one 
of these quartiles were included in portfolio CG1 (firms with 
low CGSs) or portfolio CG4 (companies with high CGSs) 
respectively. Portfolios CG2 and CG3 respectively consisted 
of firms within quartiles 2 and 3. Risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns were estimated for each of these four portfolios on a 
monthly basis. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to summarise the panel 
dataset. A fixed effects regression model that controls for 
omitted variables in panel data that are constant over the 
period of time and vary across the cross-sectional units was 
employed. The Breusch-Pagan test was used to control for 
heteroskedastic specification error. Multicollinearity was 
moderated by the sample size and the fit of the regression 
model. Acceptable tolerance values (> 0.2 - 0.3) were 
determined for the predictors. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The CGS descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4. 
 
The annual mean and median CGS increased over the 
research period. This positive trend could be ascribed to 
enhanced awareness and knowledge among managers and 
directors regarding the practical application of the King II 
guidelines. Although the range decreased over time, some 
firms had very poor compliance (as reflected by the minimum 
scores below 30). Figure 2 provides details on the annual 
mean ROA and ROE profitability ratios. 
Table 4: Corporate governance scores 
 
Years 
Valid 
n  
Mean Median 
Min 
(a) 
Max 
(a) 
Standard  
deviation 
(SD) 
2002 191 39 39 9 67 12 
2003 192 45 47 10 69 12 
2004 166 49 51 9 72 12 
2005 161 51 53 13 71 12 
2006 146 52 54 16 71 12 
2007 141 52 56 16 70 12 
2008 150 55 57 14 72 11 
2009 151 57 59 21 72 10 
2010 141 59 62 27 74 10 
(a) The lowest and highest potential CGS was 0 and 74 respectively 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean profitability ratios (%) 
 
Perusal of Figure 2 shows that the annual mean ROE values 
were higher than the corresponding ROA values (except for 
2009), possibly owing to financial leverage. The decreasing 
trend in the mean ROA and ROE ratios between 2008 and 
2009 were not surprising, since South Africa experienced a 
recession in the first semester of 2009. Figure 3 illustrates the 
trend in the mean annual EPS (nominal values; cents per 
share) and TSR (%) between 2002 and 2010. 
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Figure 3: Mean EPS (cent per share) and TSR (%) 
values 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the mean EPS ratio increased 
substantially from 2002 to 2006. Although steadily increasing 
EPS values could be ascribed to an improved financial 
position, inflation and changes in the number of ordinary 
shares would have a similar impact on this ratio. During 
2007-2009, the mean EPS values decreased as a result of the 
global financial crisis and the local recession. The mean TSR 
values increased between 2002 and 2004, possibly as a result 
of South Africa’s high economic growth during this period. 
Thereafter, the mean TSR values gradually decreased in the 
run-up to the global financial crisis. 
 
Extreme performance values could be ascribed to abnormal 
profits/losses and small/zero denominators. Winsorising was 
used to adjust performance outliers. Values in excess of three 
standard deviations from the mean were classified as outliers 
and were replaced by a value equal to the mean ± three 
standard deviations. Regression analyses (refer to Table 5) 
were conducted on the winsorised dataset (1 417 annual CGS 
and performance observations for 227 firms). 
 
In contrast to previous emerging market researchers (refer to 
Table 1) who reported a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and ROA and ROE respectively, no 
significant relationships were observed between the CGS and 
the investigated profitability ratios in this study. 
 
The significant positive association between CGS and EPS 
could be interpreted as evidence of a link between sound 
corporate governance and financial performance. The EPS 
ratio, however, could be “inflated” by means of share 
buybacks, without improving actual performance. Share 
repurchases increased between 1999, when JSE-listed firms 
were initially allowed to buy back shares, and the late 2000s 
(Bester, Wesson & Hamman, 2010). In addition, the CGSs of 
firms could be artificially improved by window-dressing 
practices. Shareholders’ scepticism about investee firms’ 
corporate governance compliance practices and the reporting 
thereof might influence their investment decisions. The 
positive relationship between EPS and CGS should thus be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
The negative association observed between CGS and TSR 
could appear unexpected, given that a well-functioning 
capital market requires a robust corporate governance 
framework that rewards shareholders for their monitoring of 
managers’ actions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2012). Officer (2011), however, argued 
that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to 
pay out cash dividends. Positive share price reactions to these 
dividend announcements would contribute towards an 
increase in TSR, providing a possible explanation for high 
TSRs reported by some badly governed firms. 
 
Table 5: Regression analysis results for CGS and EPS, 
ROA, ROE and TSR 
 
Preferred 
model 
Test for 
fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test 
for random 
effects (F) 
Fit of 
the 
model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 18.46** 2 065.78** 
18.62** 
(4, 
1 099) 
Regression 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t-value Pr > |t| 
EPS 0.014** 0.002 7.323** 0.000 
ROA -0.024 0.069 -0.343 0.731 
ROE 0.004 0.008 0.488 0.625 
TSR -1.933** 0.545 -3.547** 0.000 
BreuschPagan test for 
heteroskedasticity (BP) 
t-value adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity  
EPS 
445.04** 
4.770** 
ROA -0.279 
ROE 0.406 
TSR -3.741** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level 
R-squared = 0.06; the quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was 
significant. 
 
An alternative explanation for the negative relationship is 
related to shareholders’ perceptions of corporate governance. 
The implementation of corporate governance mechanisms 
can be costly in terms of time and money allocated to such 
initiatives. If local investors regard (costly) initiatives as 
unnecessary, the share market might penalise firms with high 
CGSs. Possible mistrust in the accuracy of reporting practices 
could also result in low share prices and hence low TSRs for 
some of the considered firms with high CGSs. 
 
When considering the negative association between CGS and 
TSR, it should also be taken into account that while the mean 
CGS gradually increased over the research period, the mean 
TSR fluctuated. Negative TSR values were furthermore 
reported during the height of the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis. These contrasting trends make it difficult to determine 
whether the observed negative relationship was due to the 
market’s lack of appreciation of corporate governance (or 
even penalisation for such initiatives), or rather due to the 
changes in the these two variables over the research period. 
 
Regression analyses were also conducted where all variables 
were lagged for one year, and by considering inflation-
adjusted EPS (to account for possible inflation-related 
distortion). The results remained consistent. Given that none 
of the measures reported so far were adjusted for risk, risk-
adjusted abnormal returns (as denoted by Jensen’s alpha) 
were estimated for four corporate governance portfolios by 
employing the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model. 
The results of these estimations are provided in Tables 6 and 
7. 
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Table 6: CAPM estimation results 
 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate of α 
Estimate of 
β 
R-squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1: very low CGSs 35 4.140% 1.757%** 0.586** 0.234 0.047 32.356** 
2: low to average CGSs 49 0.385% 0.606% 0.486** 0.087 0.070 10.143** 
3: moderate CGSs 56 1.463% 0.654% 0.759** 0.360 0.045 59.693** 
4: high CGSs 64 2.450% 1.250%** 0.580** 0.281 0.041 41.374** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level   
Degrees of freedom: 1; 106; the quality of fit of all models was significant. 
Regression equation based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) (Lee, Lee & Lee, 2009): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp (Rmt –  Rft)+ ϵp  
Where: R
pt
 is the return on portfolio p during month t   R
ft
 is the monthly risk-free rate (as measured by the return on the R186) 
R
mt
 is the monthly return on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index  α
p
  is the estimated risk-adjusted abnormal return generated by portfolio p 
β
p
 is the systematic risk of portfolio p    ϵ
p
  is the error term 
 
The alphas of both portfolios CG1 and CG4 were positive and 
significant. The risk-adjusted abnormal return of portfolio 
CG1 is considerably lower (approximately 2.4%) than its 
TSR. The mean TSR of portfolio CG1 hence appear to be 
achieved at a high level of risk. In contrast, the mean TSR and 
alpha of portfolio CG4 only differs by approximately 1.2 per 
cent, a sign that this portfolio exposed investors to relatively 
less risk than portfolio CG1. Portfolios CG1 and CG4 had 
similar beta values, reflecting some unexpected results. 
Previous researchers (e.g. Strugnell, Gilbert & Kruger, 2011; 
Van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003) reported that the beta 
estimates of South African firms could be inversely related to 
their returns. The interpretation of beta values should thus be 
conducted with care within the South African corporate 
context (Erasmus, 2013). 
 
As shown in Table 7, investors, who invested in the 
considered firms with the highest CGSs during the research 
period, earned a significant positive risk-adjusted abnormal 
return. Only one size-related beta was significant. A possible 
explanation is that the firms’ sizes were already accounted 
for, since the FTSE/JSE All Share Index is weighted 
according to market capitalisation. The negative 
value/growth betas of portfolios CG3 and CG4 indicate that 
growth shares have outperformed value shares. Growth 
shares typically have above-average earnings growth. Such 
firms prefer to reinvest earnings to fund growth opportunities 
rather than to pay out dividends (Besley & Brigham, 2008). 
Growth firms could thus have more funds available to invest 
in corporate governance initiatives than their counterparts 
that pay out dividends. 
 
Monthly equally-weighted portfolio returns were also 
determined, based on the average monthly share returns of the 
considered firms. When this alternative proxy for the market 
return was employed, the CAPM estimation indicated a 
positive, but not significant alpha for Portfolio CG4, while a 
significant positive alpha was observed for portfolio CG1. 
The Fama-French three-factor estimation indicated a 
significant positive alpha for portfolio CG4, while an 
insignificant negative alpha was reported for portfolio CG1. 
 
 
Table 7: Fama-French three-factor model estimation results 
 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate of 
β3 
Adjusted R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1: very low 
CGSs 
35 4.140% 1.061%** 0.593** -0.039 0.495** 0.448 0.040 29.952** 
2: low to 
average 
CGSs 
49 0.385% 1.065%* 0.609** 0.712** -0.102 0.478 0.053 33.677** 
3: moderate 
CGSs 
56 1.463% 0.993%* 0.768** 0.084 -0.220** 0.385 0.044 23.315** 
4: high  
CGSs 
64 2.450% 1.595%** 0.572** -0.006 -0.254** 0.342 0.039 19.499** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level 
Degrees of freedom: 3; 104. The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
Regression equation based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) (Fama & French, 1992): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp1 (Rmt –  Rft)+ βp2SMB + βp3HML +  ϵp 
Where: R
pt
 is the return on portfolio p during month t   R
ft
 is the monthly risk-free rate (as measured by the return on the R186) 
R
mt
 is the monthly return on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index  α
p
  is the estimated risk-adjusted abnormal return generated by portfolio p 
β
p1
 is the systematic risk of portfolio p    β
p2
is the sensitivity of portfolio p to the size factor 
β
p3
is the sensitivity of portfolio p to the value/growth factor  SMB is the size factor 
HML is the value/growth factor    ϵ
p
  is the error term 
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Based on the reported results, both null hypotheses were 
rejected. The results indicated both positive (significant EPS 
and insignificant ROE) and negative (insignificant ROA and 
significant TSR) relationships between financial performance 
and corporate governance. Positive risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns were reported for the portfolio comprising the 
companies with the highest corporate governance scores by 
employing both the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor 
model. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In contrast to previous emerging market researchers who 
predominantly focused on board-related variables, 
comprehensive CGSs reflecting both disclosure and 
acceptability criteria were compiled for this study. A 
combination of different performance measures employed in 
previous studies was furthermore used to distinguish between 
different aspects of financial performance.  
 
A significant positive relationship was observed between 
CGS and the accounting-based EPS ratio. It should, however, 
be noted that management has a degree of control over both 
EPS and the level of corporate governance compliance. The 
observed positive association might hence partially be 
attributed to the actions of managers. A statistically 
significant negative relationship was noted between CGS and 
the market-based TSR measure. This finding might be 
attributed to shareholders’ scepticism regarding the true 
nature of some firms’ compliance practices. A combination 
of high compliance costs and perceived window-dressing 
activities might have affected the market’s perception of 
corporate governance compliance. The negative association 
might hence be ascribed to market perceptions related to 
“unnecessary, costly corporate governance expenses”.  
 
Since the mean TSRs were negatively affected during the 
crisis period while the CGSs continued to improve, it was 
difficult to infer whether the observed association was due to 
negative perceptions, or rather due to changes in the variables 
over time. Given Schopenhauer’s statement that a concept 
(corporate governance) will first be ridiculed and resisted, 
before it will be accepted, the negative association might 
indicate that corporate governance is, to a certain extent, not 
yet properly understood or appreciated by some local 
corporate role-players. 
 
To assess the potential risk reducing benefits of sound 
corporate governance compliance, the CAPM and Fama-
French three-factor models were employed to estimate risk-
adjusted abnormal share returns for four corporate 
governance-sorted portfolios. Both the CAPM and Fama-
French three-factor model estimations indicated significant 
positive alphas for the portfolio containing firms with the 
highest CGSs. Although the portfolio of firms with the lowest 
CGSs also reported a significant positive alpha, there was a 
marked decline from the TSRs reported for these firms. These 
results highlight that the high TSRs reported by low CGS 
firms were achieved at the expense of exposing shareholders 
to a high degree of risk. 
Limitations and recommendations 
 
Recommendations are offered to various stakeholders, 
including shareholders, managers, directors, the media and 
academics. More shareholders should come on board by 
realising and appreciating the possible benefits (as reflected 
by risk-adjusted returns) that are associated with acceptable 
corporate governance practices. Furthermore, the perceived 
business case for corporate governance might encourage the 
managers and directors of the considered companies to 
improve their corporate governance practices in future. 
 
Enhanced education and training is required to further 
improve managers’ and directors’ understanding of corporate 
governance. In addition, the local media can encourage 
corporate governance discussions by reporting on corporate 
governance accomplishments and concerns. A combination 
of education, training and public dialogue could change the 
mind-sets of corporate role players. In future, shareholders, 
managers and directors might then regard sound corporate 
governance compliance as essential instead of being a mere 
obligation. 
 
Recommendations for future research are based on two 
identified limitations. Firstly, companies that were listed in 
the basic materials, oil and gas and financials industries were 
excluded from the sample, due to their financial reporting and 
extent of regulation that differ from the considered industries. 
Future researchers might consider the relationship between 
the financial performance and corporate governance practices 
of such companies. Secondly, the researchers were interested 
in the recommendations of the King II Report. Future studies 
can employ the guidelines of the King III Report (which 
focuses on integrated reporting) to compile scores based on 
JSE-listed firms’ environmental, social and corporate 
governance aspects. The relationship between such scores 
and the considered firms’ financial performance can then be 
examined. 
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